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On Acquiring Expertise in Medicine 
Henk G. Schmidt I and Henny P. A. Boshuizen I 
This article presents a new theory of expertise development in medicine and 
the empirical evidence available. This theory describes expertise development 
as the progression through a series of consecutive phases, each of which is 
characterized by functionally different knowledge structures underlying 
performance. The first phase is characterized by the accumulation of causal 
knowledge about disease and its consequences. Through experience with real 
cases, this knowledge transforms into narrative structures called illness scripts. 
The cognitive mechanisms responsible for this transition are: Encapsulation 
of elaborated knowledge into high level but simplified causal models or even 
diagnostic categories and tuning through the inclusion of contextual 
information. The third phase is characterized by the use of episodic memories 
of actual patients in the diagnosis of new cases. It is assumed that knowledge 
acquired in different phases form layers in memory through a sedimentation 
process. These knowledge sediments, although usually not applied any more 
in subsequent phases in the development ofexpertise, remain available for use 
when ontologically more recently acquired structures fail to produce an 
adequate representation f a clinical problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, The Nature of Expertise dited by Chi, Glaser, and Farr was 
published. In the introduction, Glaser and Chi summarized the main find- 
ings of 40 years of research in this area of cognition. Their list consisted 
mainly of empirical generalizations, uch as: experts excel mainly in their 
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own domain; experts are faster than novices at performing the skills of 
their domain, and they quickly solve problems with little error; experts have 
superior short-term and long-term memory; experts see and represent a
problem in their domain at a deeper (more principled) level than do nov- 
ices; novices tend to represent a problem at a superficial level; and so forth. 
From their summary it seems as if only limited theoretical progress has 
been made since De Groot's seminal work on expertise in chess published 
in 1946. 
There may be several reasons for this disappointing observation, three 
of which are offered here. First, most research into expertise in various 
domains has been largely descriptive. Investigators, following De Groot's 
(1946) early example, have been mainly interested in demonstrating differ- 
ences in performance between subjects of different levels of expertise with- 
out considering the mechanisms underlying these performance differences. 
In order to make progress in an area, studies are needed that try to explain 
the empirical phenomena described. Second, the preferred method in this 
area is quasi-experimental comparison of performance of subjects known 
to be of different expertise. Although informative, this approach is a rela- 
tively weak one, because it does not allow for active manipulation of vari- 
ables of interest. Third, unlike other areas in cognitive research (e.g., 
memory), the field appears to lack stable empirical phenomena whose ex- 
planation may contribute to a better understanding of the nature of exper- 
tise and of how it develops in human beings. 
In this article, we hope to demonstrate that a more explanation- 
oriented, experimental pproach may open new avenues to understanding 
expertise and its development. This approach tests specific hypotheses about 
the nature of the cognitive structures responsible for expert performance and 
concentrates on apparent anomalies reported in the literature. 
The domain of interest, medical expertise, is an appealing subject 
for study. Like other domains, such as solving physics problems (Chi, 
Feltovich, and Glaser, 1981), reconstructing historical events (Whineburg, 
1991), or understanding social science problems (Voss, Greene, Post, and 
Penner, 1983), the problems of medicine are ill-defined and take many 
years to achieve an acceptable level of mastery. In addition, the practice 
of medicine involves diagnostic reasoning based on underlying principles 
or rules used to arrive at a solution. Like medicine, many problems in the 
real world require some kind of diagnosis based on conceptual knowledge 
to characterize or understand a situation and act upon it in an appropriate 
way. 
In the next sections, first our theory on the development of medical 
expertise will be presented. Next, empirical evidence derived from our own 
research project and from other researchers will be discussed as well as 
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unanswered questions that need further investigation. We will conclude by 
a discussion of our research plans and of possible educational implications 
of the theory and the data available. 
A MODEL OF EXPERTISE DEVELOPMENT 
Current theories dealing with expertise (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, and 
Glaser, 1981; Chi, Glaser, and Rees, 1982; Lesgold, Rubinson, Feltovich, 
Glaser, Klopfer, and Wang, 1988) consider its development largely a 
process of extension of causal knowledge about a domain. Through edu- 
cation and experience, subjects acquire more relevant concepts and de- 
velop richer and more meaningful relations between them leading to a 
better structure for the tasks at hand. Lesgold et aL (1988), for instance, 
assume that expert radiologists' uperior diagnostic skills are based on a 
richer biomedical knowledge base and on a deeper understanding of the 
causes and consequences of disorders observed on X-rays than interme- 
diates and novices in that area have available. For these theorists, the 
development of expertise seems to be essentially a linear process, mainly 
characterized by the acquisition of more, and better structured, knowl- 
edge. Vosniadou and Brewer (1987), following Carey (1985), describe this 
position as the "weak restructuring" postulate, as opposed to a "radical" 
restructuring view of expertise development. In the latter view, novices 
do not just have a poorer knowledge base than experts, but their knowl- 
edge is different; different in terms of its concepts, different also in struc- 
ture. From the radical restructuring perspective, the development of 
expertise would involve, in addition to a process of knowledge labora- 
tion, several shifts in the knowledge base resulting in new conceptuali- 
zations of the domain. 
The theory proposed in this article takes this radical view on expertise 
development. I  postulates that the development of expertise in medicine 
can only be properly understood by assuming certain kinds of knowledge- 
base shifts in the course of growth towards expertise, resulting in a devel- 
opmental process that can be characterized bya sequence of distinct phases 
in which the learner uses qualitatively different knowledge bases while di- 
agnosing a case. 
According to this central postulate, experienced physicians, while di- 
agnosing routine cases, are operating upon knowledge structures that are 
distinctly different from those of novice physicians and students. These ex- 
pert knowledge structures, which we describe as "illness scripts," emerge 
from continuing exposure to patients and are, therefore, largely the result 
of extended practice. These illness scripts contain relatively little knowledge 
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about pathophysiological causes of symptoms and complaints but have a 
wealth of clinically relevant information about disease, its consequences, 
and the context under which the illness develops. Illness scripts seem to 
exist at various levels of generality, ranging from representations of disease 
categories to representations of individual patients een before. Indeed, one 
salient feature of our theory is the notion that physicians actually use the 
memories of previous patients while diagnosing a new case (cf. Allen, Nor- 
man, and Brooks, 1988). Our position as to how these expert structures 
develop can be summarized as follows. 
In the course of their medical training, students acquire rich, elabo- 
rated causal networks explaining the causes and consequences of disease 
in terms of general underlying biological or pathophysiological processes. 
However, through extensive and repeated application of knowledge ac- 
quired and, particularly, through exposure to patient problems, these dec- 
larative networks become encapsulated 2 into diagnostic labels or high 
level, simplified causal models explaining signs and symptoms. In this en- 
capsulation process, low-level, detailed concepts are clustered together, 
resulting in higher-level concepts. These higher-level concepts replace the 
elaborate causal networks in expert clinical reasoning. At the same time, 
a transition takes place from a network-type of knowledge organization 
to the narrative structures we refer to as "illness scripts." While solving 
a problem, a physician searches for an appropriate script. When he has 
selected one (or a few), he will tend to match its elements to the infor- 
mation provided by the patient. In the course of this script-verification 
process, the script becomes instantiated. Instantiated scripts, in turn, do 
not become decontextualized after use but remain available in memory 
as episodic traces of previously diagnosed patients and will be used in 
the diagnosis of future similar problems. Finally, knowledge structures 
acquired during the different phases of development, pathophysiological 
networks, encapsulated structures, illness scripts, and episodic traces of 
instantiated scripts, do not decay; neither do they become inert, nor in- 
accessible. They sedimentate into multiple "layers" which are accessed 
when ontogenetically more recently acquired structures fail in producing 
an adequate representation f a clinical problem (Schmidt, Norman, and 
Boshuizen, 1990). 
2The notion of knowledge ncapsulation is analogous to the notions of knowledge compilation 
(Anderson, 1983, 1987), and chunking (Laird, Rosenbloom, and Newell, 1986), all leading 
to a marked acceleration of search through a knowledge base. The term "encapsulation" 
was, however, introduced to emphasize the abbreviations in search processes resulting from 
knowledge application without rendering the original knowledge base inaccessible. See for 
details Schmidt and Bashuizen (1992). 
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EVIDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF ELABORATE 
CAUSAL NETWORKS AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT 
ENCAPSULATION 
Intermediate Effect Studies 
Evidence supporting the idea of transitory phases in expertise devel- 
opment is partly based on studies of the way subjects of different levels of 
medical expertise represent clinical cases describing the complaints, signs, 
and symptoms of a particular patient. A typical experiment consists of four 
elements: (a) presentation of a clinical case, (b) recall of the case, (c) ex- 
planation of the signs and symptoms in terms of underlying pathophysiol- 
ogy, and (d) diagnosis. Researchers working in this paradigm (cf. Patel and 
Groen, 1986) assume that the nature and the amount of the recall are 
dependent on the knowledge structures activated to comprehend the text; 
hence the recall of the case depicts the subject's problem representation 
or "problem model" (Kintsch and Greeno, 1985), while the pathophysiology 
protocol is assumed to directly reflect the activated knowledge structures 
used in the process of comprehending the case. 
Studies of clinical case processing by students in the early years of 
medical education almost invariably show a steep increase in the number 
of propositions recalled. Boshuizen (1989) for instance, presented 48 sec- 
ond-, fourth- and fifth-year students 3 and 16 family physicians with either 
a case of prostatitis or pancreatitis. Subsequently, the subjects were re- 
quired to recall whatever they could remember f om the case. She found 
that the fourth and fifth-year students recalled almost wice as many items 
from the case as the second-year students. These results suggest hat the 
knowledge structures mobilized in the processing of clinical cases become 
more elaborate, richer, and better organized as a function of developing 
expertise. However, the family physicians involved in the Boshuizen study 
recalled significantly less information from the case than the fourth- and 
fifth-year students. This finding is in accordance with other recall studies 
(e.g., Claessen and Boshuizen, 1985; Hassebrock, Bullemer, and Johnson, 
1988; Muzzin, Norman, Feightner, and Tugwell, 1983; Patel and Medley- 
Mark, 1986). These studies also demonstrate hat recall performance of 
subjects involved in patient care actually decreases with increasing expertise. 
Expert physicians typically recall fewer propositions than do intermediate- 
level medical students who recall more than novices. This phenomenon has 
become known as the "intermediate effect" in clinical case representation 
studies. 
3Medical students in the Netherlands follow a 6-year curriculum. 
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In an attempt o find the source of the intermediate effect, Schmidt, 
Boshuizen, and Hobus (1988) asked subjects of five different levels of exper- 
tise, ranging from lay persons (first-year health sciences students) to internists, 
to study a case of acute bacterial endocarditis. The number of propositions 
recalled reflected a clear-cut intermediate effect, fourth-year medical students 
having the highest recall. In addition, Schmidt et al. asked subjects to explain 
the signs and symptoms displayed in the case description in terms of under- 
lying pathophysiology in an attempt to capture the knowledge active during 
processing of the endocarditis case. These pathophysiology protocols were 
segmented into propositions. The data showed a strong intermediate effect 
in the number of propositions produced in the pathophysiology protocols as 
well. Recall and pathophysiology output were correlated .57. Qualitative 
analyses of the pathophysiology networks, derived from the subjects' proto- 
cols, showed that extensive knowledge ncapsulation takes place as soon as 
subjects become exposed to actual patients, encapsulation being strongest 
among the internists. For instance, fourth year preclinical students often try 
to account for almost every cue embedded in the text of the endocarditis 
case, using whatever biological or pathophysiological knowledge is available, 
suggesting that extensive processing has taken place. Explanation is at a de- 
tailed level; quite a few of the propositions produced include basic physi- 
ological mechanisms. By contrast, the internists' propositions include only a 
few cues provided by the case, and explanations are highly encapsulated. 
There is no reference to causative agents like bacteria nor to pathophysi- 
ological processes such as inflammation reaction, seeding of bacteria into the 
bloodstream, and lodging on the aortic valve, although all these concepts are 
important in the explanation of acute bacterial endocarditis. These concepts 
seem to be embedded in a few highly condensed m often diagnostic-  con- 
cepts (e.g., sepsis, aorta insufficiency, embolisms) and their relationships. 
Explanatory concepts at the (patho)physiological level have become ncap- 
sulated into concepts of greater generality. 
In the same experiment, Schmidt et al. (1988) manipulated the amount 
of time available for processing the clinical case. They were able to show 
that if processing time is restricted, the intermediate effect in both recall 
and pathophysiology disappears. Instead, a weak positive linear relation with 
expertise level is found. From these data, they conclude that students and 
experienced physicians eem to represent clinical cases in different ways, 
applying functionally different knowledge. Provided they have sufficient 
time, medical students consciously process causal pathophysiological knowl- 
edge activated by cues embedded in the text. Physicians, however, only pick 
up information that is directly relevant to the solution of the problem with- 
out much pathophysiological reasoning, simply because they possess ready- 
made cognitive structures, against which relevant information is matched. 
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A shortcoming of the 1988 study was that a causal hypothesis con- 
cerning the effect of pathophysiology activation on case processing was 
tested with an indirect method. The amount of pathophysiology activation 
was inferred from the explanations provided only after the actual proc- 
essing had taken place. Therefore, a second experiment was conducted in 
which subjects' prior knowledge of pathophysiology was primed 4by having 
them recall whatever they knew about endocarditis for either 30 sec or 
3.5 min. Subsequently, both groups studied the endocarditis case for 
30 sec (Schmidt and Boshuizen, 1993). It was hypothesized that students' 
recall, at the novice and intermediate levels, would be mediated by the 
amount of knowledge activated, while experts' recall would not. Hence, it 
was expected that differences in the amount of priming would only affect 
students' recall. Two effects of the manipulation of amount of pathophysi- 
ology activation were found. The first was that students who had only 
30 sec to activate relevant prior knowledge remembered less information 
from the case than did those who had 3 min and 30 sec for activation, 
although both groups had the same amount of time available to study the 
case. The internists' recall turned out to be entirely independent of the 
experimental manipulation. Second, an intermediate ffect was found in 
the data. Students of intermediate l vels recalled more information from 
the case than did novices and experts. (See Figure 1 on the next page.) 
These findings further support the notion that the intermediate ffect in 
clinical case recall indeed results from the activation of elaborate, causal, 
pathophysiological knowledge by students of intermediate l vels of exper- 
tise. In addition, it demonstrates that experienced physicians process clini- 
cal information using knowledge structures distinctively different from 
those of students. 
Think-Aloud Studies 
A second line of research illustrating the relatively scarce application 
of biomedical concepts by expert physicians involves naturalistic observa- 
tions and think-aloud studies. Boshuizen, Schmidt, and Coughlin (1987), 
for instance, using a think-aloud methodology, showed that general prac- 
titioners rarely refer to pathophysiological concepts while reasoning about 
a case, whereas tudents use pathophysiological concepts extensively in the 
same situation (see also the review by Patel, Evans, and Groen, 1989). 
4This technique was adapted from Peeck, Van den Bosch, and Kreupeling (1982) who 
demonstrated that priming of prior knowledge previous to the processing of a relevant ext 
facilitates comprehension a d recall of that text. 
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Fig. 1. Number of propositions recalled of a clinical case studied for 30 sec by 
subjects of five different levels of expertise ranging from lay persons to experts, 
after priming of relevant knowledge during 3 min and 30 sec or during only 
30 sec. (Schmidt and Boshuizen, 1993). 
Boshuizen and Schmidt (1992) hypothesized that three mutually exclusive 
cognitive processes may account for this phenomenon: (a) After a certain 
phase in the development toward expertise, biomedical knowledge becomes 
rudimentary: Large parts of the expert's biomedical knowledge (especially 
detailed knowledge) are no longer retrievable. (b) Biomedical knowledge 
becomes inert: It is still available to medical experts, and it can be activated 
when directly addressed, but it is not used in diagnostic reasoning; clinical 
knowledge is applied instead. (c) In the course of the years, biomedical 
knowledge becomes encapsulated and is integrated into clinical knowledge 
(i.e., in clinical reasoning, experts apply encapsulated knowledge, which is 
directly linked to associated, etailed, deep-level knowledge and which can 
be retrieved whenever necessary). Using a combined on-line and post hoc 
methodology, Boshuizen and Schmidt tested these hypotheses. Twenty 
subjects of different levels of expertise were presented with a set of 20 
cards containing the signs and symptoms of a patient suffering from acute 
pancreatitis. The subjects were requested to think aloud while processing 
this information. After finishing this task, they were asked to provide a 
diagnosis and to explain the case in terms of underlying pathophysiological 
processes. The think-aloud and pathophysiology protocols of each subject 
were parsed into propositions and subsequently compared. The idea was 
that if biomedical knowledge would have become rudimentary and no 
longer retrievable, one would find a decrease of this category of knowledge 
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with increasing levels of expertise in both the think-aloud and the patho- 
physiology protocols. If, however, the knowledge were still available but 
not used any more (at least not in rather straightforward cases such as this 
pancreatitis case), one might expect a decrease in references to biomedical 
concepts in think-aloud protocols associated with an increase in expertise, 
but an increase in the protocols collected afterward. This would indicate 
that the knowledge was still there, but that it had become inert and was 
not activated any more while solving problems. Finally, if biomedical con- 
cepts would have become encapsulated, one would expect a decrease in 
the think-aloud protocols but, at the same time, an increasing linkage be- 
tween concepts used in these protocols and the post hoc explanations. The 
data corroborated the encapsulation-hypothesis. Students produced gener- 
ally more biomedical propositions while thinking aloud, but the knowledge 
activated was less intimately linked to the knowledge represented in the 
post hoc explanations. Among the novices, the amount of overlap was only 
14.9%. This percentage increased to 56.2% in the expert group. The linear 
component associated with this trend was highly significant. Boshuizen and 
Schmidt (1992) concluded that experts use biomedical knowledge in a tacit 
way, because in the course of becoming an expert his type of causal knowl- 
edge becomes encapsulated into clinical concepts. 
In summary, quantitative and qualitative studies concentrating on the 
intermediate effect in clinical case recall and studies of the use of biomedi- 
cal concepts in clinical reasoning both seem to indicate that preclinical 
students primarily construct problem representations using detailed 
biomedical knowledge. In order to make sense of a case, they have to ac- 
tivate and process this knowledge in a conscious fashion, a cognitive activity 
that takes considerable time because no ready-made structures are avail- 
able. As soon as patients are encountered, a shift emerges. The confron- 
tation with similar patients for a couple of times (on a cardiology ward, 
for instance) induces "short cuts" in the student's reasoning. After a while, 
the student does not need extensive pathophysiological processing any 
more; the use of a smaller number of more inclusive concepts uffices for 
understanding. Encapsulation begins to take place. The student begins to 
construct illness scripts for understanding. 
EVIDENCE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ILLNESS SCRIPTS 
AS COGNITIVE ENTITIES IN EXPERTS 
According to Feltovich and Barrows (1984), students and physicians, 
while seeing patients, pick up information about the circumstances under 
which specific diseases are likely to occur. Examples of these circumstances 
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Table I. Generic Illness Script a
Illness script ~ enabling conditions, fault, consequences 
Enabling conditions 
Fault 
Consequences 
Predisposing factors, boundary conditions, hereditary 
factors, etc. 
Predisposing factors ~ compromised host factors, 
travel, drugs, etc. 
Boundary conditions ~ age, sex, etc. 
Hereditary factors ~ etc. 
Invasion of tissue by pathogenic organism, inadequate 
nutrient supply, inability of tissue to survive, etc. 
Complaints, igns, symptoms 
Complaints ~ etc. 
Signs ~ etc. 
Symptoms ~ etc. 
a From Feltovich and Barrows (1984). 
are life style, working environment, previous disease history, age, and sex. 
These circumstances are not necessarily causally related to certain diseases, 
but enable them. They more or less "predispose" people to get a disease. 
Somebody does not get a cardiac infarction as a result of being a male 
and older than 40, but people of that sex and age more often are victims 
of a cardiac infarction than are other people. Hence, knowledge of these 
factors helps in diagnosing that illness. So, gradually, physicians develop in 
their minds typical patient histories related to certain sets of symptoms and 
a certain diagnosis, called "illness scripts." Illness scripts thus contain the 
physician's encapsulated pathophysiological knowledge of the disease and 
its consequences, in addition to clinical knowledge of the constraints under 
which a disease occurs. They are narrative structures, containing prototypi- 
cal information about a disease, which, when activated, guide a clinician 
through a case and support him in looking for relevant cues. Table I shows 
the Feltovich and Barrows generic model of an illness script. 
An implication of narrative structures i that they tend to be recalled 
in a fixed order, and this is precisely what has been demonstrated in various 
studies. Claessen and Boshuizen (1985) for instance, found that, with in- 
creasing expertise, subjects increasingly tend to group elements together in 
a way compatible with the illness script format. Their study was flawed, 
however, in the sense that the stimulus materials already had a script struc- 
ture. Coughlin (1986), however, presented novices and experts with either 
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a scripted or a scrambled version of a clinical case. Whereas the recall of 
the novices was greatly affected by the experimental manipulation, the re- 
call of the experts displayed the typical script-like structure, irrespective of 
the structure of the text presented. These data indicate that, while proc- 
essing a case, experts represent patient information in pre-existing linear 
structures that have a fixed order. 
In a study of the role played by enabling conditions in the activation 
of an appropriate script, Hobus, Schmidt, Boshuizen, and Patel (1987) pre- 
sented experienced and inexperienced family physicians with 32 clinical 
cases, each consisting of a patient chart, a picture of the patient, and his 
main complaint. The patient chart and the picture displayed enabling-con- 
ditions information such as age, sex, previous diseases, occupation, drug 
use, and so forth. The information was presented on slides and could only 
be studied for a limited amount of time. After each case, the physician 
was asked to state a preliminary diagnostic hypothesis. Afterward the sub- 
jects were asked to recall as much as they could about the patients pre- 
sented. The complaint associated with each case, together with the subject's 
own diagnosis of that case, were used as a cue. The results showed that 
experienced physicians accurately diagnosed almost 40% of the cases, 
whereas the novice physicians were accurate in 27%. In addition, the ex- 
perienced physicians recalled significantly more contextual information 
about the patients presented. This finding led Hobus and colleagues to be- 
lieve that experts' unequaled iagnostic performance was based on their 
superior ability to interpret and use the enabling-conditions i formation 
provided. This assumption was tested in a second experiment by Hobus, 
Hofstra, Boshuizen, and Schmidt (1988). In this experiment, he experi- 
mental manipulation consisted of presenting the complaint either with or 
without the patient chart and the picture. The task of the subjects was to 
formulate a preliminary diagnostic hypothesis based on the available infor- 
mation. When presented with all the information, the experienced physi- 
cians produced twice as many accurate diagnoses as compared with the 
inexperienced physicians. These results corroborated the findings of the 
1987 study. However, the number of accurate diagnoses produced by the ex- 
perienced physicians decreased to almost 50% when no patient chart and pic- 
ture were provided, whereas the inexperienced physicians were only marginally 
affected. These results clearly demonstrate he overriding importance of 
enabling conditions in the activation of relevant illness scripts. In addition, 
they demonstrate hat this knowledge is only acquired through extended 
practice. It is the daily confrontation with patient problems above all else 
that provides the opportunities for acquiring contextual knowledge ssential 
to the development of expertise. 
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EVIDENCE FOR THE USE OF INSTANCES IN THE 
DIAGNOSIS OF NEW CASES 
According to Brooks (1987), the human ability to categorize objects 
is as much determined by earlier experience with an object that resembles 
the present one as it is determined by abstract, decontextualized rules link- 
ing sets of features to category names. His work prompted Norman and 
his associates (Allen, Norman, and Brooks, •988; Norman, Rosenthal, 
Brooks, Allen, and Muzzin, 1989) to test the hypothesis that diagnostic per- 
formance of physicians and medical students is influenced by exposure to 
previous patients who looked like the present patient. In one experiment 
(Allen et al., 1988), first-year medical students were required to study a set 
of rules to diagnose dermatological diseases. Next, they were presented with 
24 slides displaying six different diseases to practice the rules. The slides 
were shown several times, and feedback was provided after each attempt 
in order to ensure the learning of the rules. The experimental manipulation 
involved the choice of the slides used in the practice set. Two different 
sets were used, with the intention of biasing the diagnosis of slides in the 
test series. For example, if one of the ambiguous test slides was a case of 
lichen planus on the wrist which might be confused with contact dermatitis, 
then one practice set would contain a similar lichen planus on the wrist, 
and the other would contain a similar appearing contact dermatitis on the 
wrist. All subjects received the same test slides. If subjects' diagnostic be- 
havior was based on the application of the rules, no incorrect diagnoses 
were to be expected, because the location of the skin disease or other con- 
textual aspects were not in any way part of the rules (in fact, they were 
irrelevant o the diagnosis of the particular disease), and subjects had the 
rules in front of them. If, however, their behavior was influenced by seeing 
similar exemplars from another disease, incorrect diagnoses were to be ex- 
pected. When shown an appropriate analogy, subjects correctly diagnosed 
the test slide 94% of the time. Conversely, when shown a look-alike but 
wrong analogy, only 38% of subjects elected the correct diagnosis. The 
influence of prior examples was apparent even after a week and exposure 
to further examples. These data suggest hat diagnostic performance is at 
least to the same extent determined by previous experience with similar 
exemplars as it is by the application of diagnostic rules. Studies undertaken 
with experts show similar results. In conclusion, the available evidence 
seems to suggest hat physicians tore experiences with concrete patients 
in memory and use these episodic traces in the diagnosing of similar new 
patients. 
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EVIDENCE FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF 
MULTIPLE-LAYERED KNOWLEDGE 
STRUCTURES IN EXPERTS 
In a series of studies, Patel and her colleagues (e.g., Patel, Evans, 
and Chawla, 1986b) have demonstrated that the amount of pathophysi- 
ological reasoning in protocols of subjects decreases with an increase in 
level of expertise. Thus, the more expert one is, the less one seems to rely 
on causal explanations to arrive at a diagnosis. These findings are in ac- 
cordance with the studies cited above; they imply that the nature of the 
cognitive structures upon which subjects operate changes with level of ex- 
pertise. In addition, however, Patel was able to show the same phenomenon 
to occur among physicians of the same level of expertise. In a study by 
Patel, Arocha and Groen (1986a), experts from two distinct medical spe- 
cialties were compared on tasks both within and across their domains of 
expertise. They demonstrated that physicians olving a problem outside 
their domain of expertise produced more pathophysiological explanations 
than within their domain of expertise. In addition, within the same domain, 
experts who were more involved in clinical research and, hence, saw fewer 
patients also tended to rely more on pathophysiological explanation than 
did their colleagues who saw patients on a daily basis. Finally, Boshuizen 
(1989) demonstrated that experts are able to retrieve pathophysiological 
knowledge, dependent on the specific task one requires from them, which 
means that this kind of knowledge does not decay or become inaccessible. 
Such knowledge is just not used in detail when one is confronted with rou- 
tine cases, but it is available when a difficult case is presented and when 
available illness script knowledge does not apply or is not available. These 
studies seem to support he notion that experts have knowledge available 
in different layers. To experts, illness-script knowledge represents the pre- 
ferred level. However, when a case is presented for which no knowledge 
of that kind exists they will "regress" to sub-expert or advanced-student 
levels of reasoning, involving the application of causal, pathophysiological 
reasoning. 
SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
The theory of expertise development in medicine presented in this 
paper deviates from other proposals (e.g., Lesgold, 1984) in several ways. 
The first is that it assumes that the development of expertise can be de- 
scribed as the progression through a series of transitory phases. Second, 
knowledge acquired during different phases of expertise development has 
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a distinctly different organization, earlier forms tending to be organized 
in causal networks, more recent forms being structured as scripts. Third, 
it is assumed that knowledge acquired in different phases form layers in 
memory through a sedimentation process. Fourth, these knowledge sedi- 
ments, although usually not applied any more in subsequent phases in the 
development of expertise, remain available for use when more recently 
acquired structures fail in producing an adequate representation f a clini- 
cal problem. Fifth, episodic traces of clinical problems previously analyzed 
seem to be extensively used in the representation and solution of new 
cases. 
This theoretical framework establishes an agenda for future research. 
One aspect o be pursued is knowledge ncapsulation, especially the ques- 
tion whether encapsulation is a gradual or a one-trial learning process. An- 
other research question concerns changes in the structure and function of 
illness scripts during development toward expertise. The illness-script stud- 
ies described in this article only cover the more advanced stretch of the 
developmental path (viz. the period after graduation from medical school). 
Earlier stages also have to be investigated. Furthermore, the process of 
activation and verification of hypotheses will have to be studied in more 
detail. A final research line addresses the flexibility in expert reasoning. 
The questions of whether, when, and how experts revert o ontogenetically 
less recent knowledge structures when trying to diagnose or treat a patient 
must especially be investigated. 
The theory and the associated empirical data available suggest hat 
several aspects of the learning process of medical students might be en- 
hanced by educational measures. During the first phase of knowledge ac- 
quisition, integration of knowledge from different subject matters hould 
be stimulated in order to acquire valid, integrated, and elaborate causal 
networks. A curriculum consisting of a set of parallel and sequenced 
courses without moments of integration does not help the student o reach 
this goal. Furthermore, our research shows the necessity of illness scripts 
in clinical reasoning. Educators can guide students' knowledge ncapsula- 
tion and illness-script formation by providing representative cases of rep- 
resentative diseases from a specific category. Now, especially during 
internships, tudents' attention is too often drawn toward rare diseases and 
strange cases of ordinary diseases, which they must observe in order to 
take advantage of such a rare opportunity. Instead, their attention should 
be drawn primarily toward the more ordinary patients. Finally, students 
might be sensitized to the importance of enabling-conditions i formation 
in hypothesis generation and verification. This aspect, which seems to be 
characteristic for expert clinical reasoning, is lacking in sub-experts. Infor- 
mal observations suggest hat students deny the importance of enabling- 
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conditions information. Apparently, they are of the opinion that clinical 
reasoning must be based on "solid" information such as signs and symp- 
toms. This analysis uggests that a curriculum that supposes practical ex- 
perience will suffice for the development of relevant, flexible illness scripts 
relies too heavily on the epidemiology at one specific place, during one 
specific, possibly short time of the year (e.g., a very specialized hospital 
ward, in winter). Instead, it is required that students are presented with 
relevant, representative problems and cases, in order to steer their learning 
processes. 
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